Does the "Turkish-Iranian Alliance" in Yemen inherit the "Saudi-Emirati Alliance"?
English - Wednesday 17 June 2020 الساعة 02:12 pm
Mocha, Newsyemen, Editorial Team:
Matters in the Houthi militia-controlled areas of northern Yemen have reached a climax, but this should not give rise to a belief that conditions are now ripe for a popular uprising sweeping the putschists and their repressive power. The nation lack both security and hope.
In the highly complex and abusive conditions that afflict the people for the sixth year in a row, and under the tyranny, starvation, and epidemic pandemics topped by the Coronavirus, relying on the anger and revolution of people to confront the Houthis seems impossible, where the people lacked the confidence, inspiring leadership, and a ready and motivated alternative to capture the historic opportunity
Despair is growing in popularity, politically and even militarily.
Reflecting on the map of the conflict and the diaspora of projects and powers, the performance of legitimacy and its parties on the opposite side is causing despair, as they lack for a real coherent and serious force that has morals and political commitment to the country and the population.
The most that serves the Houthis in these circumstances is not the accumulation and the growing power of the Houthis and the tools of pressure, influence and control that are in their hands, but the accumulation and the growing weakness, impotence, failure and corruption of the parties that have eroded the legitimacy and changed its content away from the goal of restoring legitimacy and governance, the capital and the state and ending the Houthi coup
Why did the Brotherhood, as well as the rest of the powers, give up the idea and choice of stirring up popular anger and fueling the internal revolt against the Houthis?
The answer to these kinds of direct questions can be indirectly sought on the fronts and news of battles and war.
The war, which lost its momentum from an early time towards Sana'a and the goals of return and liberation, and entered into a series of successive setbacks.
Answers are available over the years and the setbacks of the single fateful battle that was destroyed and divided into small battles and wars of exhaustion for the spirit of resistance, the will of liberation, and the hopes and aspirations of the great people.
With the growing disregard for the people, the manifestations of expansion in attracting interventions, powers and external parties began to increase, as alternative options for the powers that have become legally dissociated from its alliance and its Arab sphere and openly proclaim the Turkish alliance, which is not the peer or opponent of the Iranian axis or Iran and its allies in the region and in Yemen in particular.
Prior to this, the Arab / Gulf alliance was dealt with in a gradual way of subversion from the inside, and through tools and forces that are themselves the main body and the most prominent content of what is said to be legitimacy that have the support, efforts, financing and services of the alliance.
Unfortunately, this was allowed to happen in full view, and the Qatari-Turkish alliance was allowed to accumulate their gains at the expense of the Saudi-Emirati coalition.
We are facing direct and clear scenarios. All the episodes of severe drift in war and conflict from the central and main goals and diverting the path of military intervention of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen towards alternative battlefields and arenas and conflict that are very far from the first goal and liberating Sanaa, regaining legitimacy, ending Iranian influence in the capital, and in the North of country.
It is regrettable and pessimistic: that the effectiveness of the coalition is eroding, while continuing to ignore all data, and continues to rely on the same tools and options for failure and the massive exhaustion of the war and its efforts and inputs over a period of six years.
It is unfortunate - for example - that aspirations and options shrink to the level of sponsorship and financing campaigns to denounce the Houthi "one-fifth" rule, when the goal was primarily to root out the Houthis and their control of power of the country as a whole.
If this is not a strategic setback, then what is the point in teaching strategies?
On the horizon of the conflict, there are no signs that things are going for the better. And the worst thing that could happen - and nothing that seems to be working to prevent it - is that Saudi interference and the Saudi alliance will gradually decrease more and more.
Meanwhile, a map of influence and sharing of coalition allied inputs and finances is gradually forming, and imposing a war-changing agenda.
This could threaten even those strongholds that the kingdom may yet reassure, that it is closed areas of influence in northeastern Yemen, in its southeastern, or east-southern.
