When legitimacy reaped failure with its "polluting" tools, Amged Khaled was as a model
English - Monday 26 April 2021 الساعة 01:42 pm
Aden, NewsYemen, Exclusive:
The case of the kidnapping of the brother of a Transitional Council leader by a military commander affiliated with the legitimacy in Aden highlights an important aspect of the image of legitimacy management and its failure in all its military and economic battles on the Yemeni arena.
Amjad Khaled, commander of the Transport Brigade, accused of kidnapping the brother of the transitional council leader Abdul Rahman, was one of the most important military leaders on whom the legitimacy and the Brotherhood's controlling lobby relied on in order to tighten the grip on Aden.
The man represents a blatant example of governing the principle of loyalty to Hadi and the Brotherhood at the expense of competence in choosing military and civilian leaders within the legitimacy, and the insistence on imposing it despite the bad history or disgraceful behavior that will result in failure at all levels.
The man and his members were known for their transgressions and attacks against the sons of the Dar Saad region, which included the headquarters of the Transport Brigade, in behavior close to the character of the militia and far from the behavior of a state army, and the incident of its members’s kidnapping of Abdel Moneim, the sheikh of the leader of the Transitional Council, Abd al-Rahman Sheikh, was only confirmation of that.
The man admitted, in an audio recording, that he had done this and justified it that it was to pressure the "transitional" to release one of his followers to the security department of Lahj governorate, and his confession came from inside the headquarters of the Arab coalition in which he is present as a member of the legitimacy of the military committee charged with redeployment according to an agreement Riyadh, despite the transitional's strong objection to imposing legitimacy on the man within the committee despite the accusations leveled against him of being involved in security incidents in Aden.
It is noteworthy that what Amjad Khaled did in a similar incident in Aden in mid-February, and its hero was Amjad's colleague, meaning that he was one of the military leaders on whom the legitimacy relied on in Aden despite his bad behavior.
Where Brigadier General Suleiman Al-Zamaki stormed the house of the governor of Taiz, Nabil Shamsan, in the Khormaksar region, to kidnap the commander of the special forces in Taiz, Brigadier General Jamil Aqlan, and force him to release one of his followers accused of criminal cases, and he was arrested by Aqlan forces in Al-Turbah, south of Taiz.
Al-Zamaki is like one of the failed options that the legitimacy tried to bet on to impose its control on Aden, and during the August 2019 confrontations, former Minister of Interior Ahmed Al-Maysari assigned Zamaki to lead the Special Forces in the governorates of Aden, Abyan, Lahj, and Al-Dhale 'instead of their leader, Major General Fadl Baish, who refused the facilitator's orders to confront Transitional.
Despite the violation of the mandate for the fact that Baash was appointed by a republican decision, the assignment has embodied the mentality by which matters are managed in the legitimacy and bequeathed to it by failure as a result of its options and tools that it relied upon in the face of its opponents, whether through futile battles in the liberated provinces or at the level of the national battle against the Houthi militia.
So the case of Zamaki and Amjad is not different from the situation of the facilitator who was chosen by President Hadi as Minister of Interior for his loyalty and not for his security expertise that he does not possess, and his presentation as a "unitary" leader who addresses the separation projects that the facilitator himself called for on television since 2011 before he regained his "unity" after his appointment. Minister in the Bin Dagher government in 2015.
Al-Maysari led the battle of legitimacy in Aden with its previous tools that have remained since its liberation and are building its financial strength at the expense of building a force for legitimacy, and the result was an army and imaginary forces on paper only that evaporated in hours in the events of August 2019.
Perhaps the strongest evidence for this is what the current Prime Minister Moein Abdel-Malik said after the overthrow of Al-Maysari, that the government saved more than one billion riyals per month after transferring the security units ’salaries to private exchange companies, which reveals the extent of corruption practiced by Al-Maysari .
Next to Al-Maysari, the former Minister of Transport, Saleh Al-Jabwani, appeared as another evidence of the failed legitimacy options in choosing its tools to lead the stage, at the expense of efficiency, integrity and experience, without looking at its history of political opportunism and the fluctuation of positions according to interest.
Al-Jabwani embodied a striking example of this by radically differing in his positions without any shame from an advocate of secession and who rejects Hadi's legitimacy to one of the guards of the war against the south in the name of unity and Hadi's legitimacy.
It is not possible to talk about al-Jabwani and al-Misri without referring to their ideal and their prime minister at the time, Ahmed Obeid bin Dagher, who had the most astonishing experience in political opportunism and jumping from something to its opposite with ease in search of power at the expense of principle.
The man who represented one of the hawks of the Socialist Party rejecting unity between the South and the North and one of the supporters of the disengagement that was announced in 94, then suddenly appeared next to the former President Ali Saleh to turn into the most prominent manifestation of unity and criticism of his former party on occasion and without occasion.
With the events of 2011 , the man emerged as one of the hawks in Saleh’s camp against calls for the overthrow of his regime and remained so even with the election of Hadi in 2012, and he disappeared from the scene with the fall of Sana’a in the hands of the Houthi in 2014 , refusing to take any position, until he suddenly appeared in Riyadh after Decisive Storm, presiding over A meeting in the name of the conference to overthrow Saleh from his presidency and appoint Hadi as his replacement.
These models summarize the story of legitimacy and the mentality of President Hadi in running the state during the years of the war, with which the name of legitimacy has transformed into a gathering of opportunists and stance dealers at the expense of the principles and the national battle to bring down the Houthi coup and restore state institutions.
